The capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro in a lightning US military raid has ignited global alarm, with one expert suggesting Beijing could mirror the tactic to target Taiwan’s leadership amid escalating cross-strait tensions. The operation, codenamed Absolute Resolve, unfolded in the early hours of January 3, 2026. More than 150 US aircraft, including F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters, B-1B Lancers, and sophisticated electronic warfare assets, suppressed Venezuelan air defences in a pre-dawn assault.

The primary focus of the kinetic strikes was the Fort Tiuna military complex and the La Carlota airbase. Delta Force commandos, supported by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (the “Night Stalkers”), stormed Maduro’s fortified compound in Caracas. According to reports, the commandos achieved total surprise, using blow torches to cut through steel-reinforced safe rooms to seize the president and his wife, Cilia Flores, while they were sleeping.

Indicted in the United States on narco-terrorism charges since March 2020, Maduro was immediately extracted to the USS Iwo Jima and flown to New York for arraignment. He and Flores have since pleaded not guilty at a Manhattan courthouse, but the geopolitical shockwaves are only just beginning to settle.

Dr Clarke H Summers, Assistant Professor of Government and Political Philosophy at Belmont Abbey College, suggests that this “Maduro model” offers Beijing a potential blueprint for coercive action against Taipei.

Dr Summers, a former US Army Reserve commander, notes that while China does not currently recognise Lai Ching-te as President of the Republic of China (ROC), it has not yet formally charged him with a crime against the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

However, he warns that if Beijing were to formally indict Lai for crimes such as international narcotics trafficking – even if the charges were fabricated – it would signal a move to justify a similar “forcible capture” and extradition.

This would allow Beijing to argue that they are following the “law enforcement” precedent set by the US in Venezuela. He notes a critical distinction, however: while the US has explicitly not asserted a claim of sovereignty over Venezuela, Beijing already claims universal sovereignty over Taiwan.

This means China might feel it requires even less justification to act if it believes a surgical operation has a reasonable chance of success. Dr Summers emphasised: “The PRC really doesn’t need a casus belli, excuse, or justification to act. The question has always been whether or not such action would have a reasonable chance of success.”

The raid also exposed significant vulnerabilities in Chinese-supplied military equipment. Venezuela’s air defence systems, including JY-27 “anti-stealth” radars and BUK-M2E surface-to-air missile batteries, failed to detect or respond effectively to US stealth aircraft.

Dr Summers describes this as a low-cost “hot wash” for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), providing them with a golden opportunity to assess their own information and air defence systems in a real-world combat scenario.

He suggests that learning these systems do not meet performance standards is a short-term loss but a long-term gain for China, giving them a window to fix these shortfalls before attempting a military seizure of Taiwan.

Dr Summers argued: “If the US extends its current digital and information warfare capabilities to Taiwan, it would be in China’s own interest to fix these shortfalls before attempting a similar action.”

Operation Absolute Resolve was the culmination of months of escalating pressure. In December 2025, the US Navy’s Fourth Fleet imposed a naval quarantine on Venezuelan oil tankers, seizing vessels like the Skipper and the Marinera to cripple the regime’s revenue.

Despite this significant commitment in the Western Hemisphere, Dr Summers assesses that US deterrence in the Indo-Pacific remains robust. He points out that the US Indo-Pacific Command still maintains two numbered fleets with four aircraft carriers immediately available to protect Taiwan.

Unless the Fourth Fleet requires more surface support to maintain the Caribbean blockade, he argues that the Venezuelan operation should not fundamentally change Beijing’s immediate tactical calculus regarding a cross-strait invasion.

The international response has been deeply divided. While China and Russia have condemned the strike as a “barbaric” violation of sovereignty, Dr Summers dismisses this critique as opportunistic and cynical.

He notes that Beijing’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine since 2022 has already done much to erode the “rules-based order” they now claim to defend.

He believes China will instead focus on a quiet diplomatic campaign to convince the US that Taiwan is not worth the cost of war. Dr Summers anticipates that Beijing will appeal to President Trump’s personal legacy, seeking a deal that guarantees trade agreements for semiconductors while accepting Chinese sovereignty over the island.

He warns that Mr Trump has previously signalled a willingness to accept compromises with China when such positions are popular with the American populace.

As Acting President Delcy Rodriguez leads a fragile transition in Caracas – having recently dialled down her rhetoric to invite an “agenda of cooperation” with Washington – the tactical lessons of the raid continue to reverberate.

The operation resulted in approximately 75–80 casualties, including 32 Cuban special forces serving as Maduro’s bodyguards. Notably, the US reported no fatalities, though seven service members were injured, including one who suffered multiple bullet wounds to his legs during the extraction.

The Venezuelan government, meanwhile, has declared seven days of national mourning, with Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello claiming the death toll could reach 100.

With Xi Jinping maintaining a firm timeline for “reunification”, the shadow of a rapid, unilateral strike now hangs heavily over the Taiwan Strait, providing both a stark warning to Taipei and a potential operational playbook for the Chinese Communist Party.